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Can Democracy Create World Peace?

Democratic Peace Theory: Misguided Policy or Panacea
Alynna Lyon
Department of Political Science

C

an democracy create world peace? The idea that
representative liberal governments can diminish the occurrence of war is one of the most
appealing, influential, and at the same time, controversial ideas of our time. For centuries, thinkers have
proposed that a world of democratic countries would
be a peaceful world. As early as 1795, Immanuel Kant
wrote in his essay Perpetual Peace that democracies
are less warlike. Within the United States, this idea has
held particular sway. Presidents like Woodrow Wilson
have embraced this idea and advocated the creation of
democracies to create a less belligerent world. Harry S.
Truman once said, “Totalitarian regimes imposed on
free peoples…undermine the foundation of international peace and hence security of the United States.”1
The Democratic Peace Theory is based on several
premises. The first argues that in democracies, populations will restrain elected leaders. This is to say that
given the choice, people will be reluctant to bear the
costs of war in terms of human life and financial treasure. Second, many think that democracies will use
political institutions to settle their domestic disputes.
Therefore, when conflict arises with another democracy,
they will be more apt to use international institutions
(i.e., the United Nations, International Court of Justice,
G-8 Summits, etc.) to resolve their international disagreements. Others believe that democracies produce a
political culture of negotiation and conciliation, claiming that people in democracies are taught that violence
is not an appropriate means of conflict resolution. The
argument holds that if a war-prone leader comes to
power in a democracy, other institutions (e.g., Congress)
will present cross-pressures (here checks and balances)
and prevent an aggressive head of state from moving a
country to war. Finally, people in democracies are believed to be more sympathetic and tolerant of people in
other democracies.2 Thus, whether it is common norms,
institutional constraints, mutual respect, or popular
will—democracy is viewed as a treatment for war

Democratic Peace and Political Science

In the 1970s, scholars began using the tools of social
science to explore this thesis and have uncovered a
significant amount of empirical research that supports
these claims. Today there are over a hundred authors
who have published scholarly works on the Democratic
Peace Theory. One study examined 416 country-tocountry wars from 1816-1980 and found that only 12
were fought between democracies.3 Bruce Russett writes
that “Established democracies fought no wars against
one another during the entire twentieth century.”4
Another proponent found that that the probability of
any two democracies engaging in war is less than half
of 1%!5 This is not to say that democracies have not gone
to war, but when considering pairs (or dyads) of democracies, there are almost no instances of war between
two democracies. Four decades of research consistently
finds significant support for this position. Moreover, the
findings remain robust as the number of democracies in
the world continues to grow. In fact, as Jack Levy points
out, Democratic Peace Theory is “as close as anything
we have to an empirical law in international relations.”6

Democratic Peace and American Foreign
Policy

Beyond academics, the last two presidential administrations have particularly embraced this research as a
policy objective and a way to build world peace. President Clinton in his 1994 State of the Union Address
proclaimed, “Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure
our security and to build a durable peace is to support
the advancement of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don’t attack each other.” More recently, current
President George W. Bush stated, “And the reason why
I’m so strong on democracy is democracies don’t go to
war with each other. And the reason why is the people
of most societies don’t like war, and they understand
what war means… I’ve got great faith in democracies
to promote peace. And that’s why I’m such a strong
believer that the way forward in the Middle East, the
broader Middle East, is to promote democracy.”7 This
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discussion has generated considerable excitement and
promoted growing expectations by both policy makers
and Western publics that this is something we should be
pursuing.8 This theory has come close to conventional
wisdom and served as a foundation for both moral and
political missions. Former Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger writes, “[a] majority of the American leaders
were convinced then as they are now that America has a
special responsibility to spread its values as its contributions to world peace.”9

The Problems of Democratic Peace

Just as the Democratic Peace Theory has its supporters,
it has also generated considerable criticisms. Alexander Hamilton presents an early rejection of this idea in
Federalist No. 6, writing: “Sparta, Athens, Rome, and
Carthage were all republics; two of them, Athens and
Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they as
often engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the
neighboring monarchies of the same times. Sparta was
little better than a well regulated camp; and Rome was
never sated of carnage and conquest.”10
In terms of the current research, establishing the correlations have been relatively easy; however, establishing
causation is more problematic. In fact, most scholars
do not agree on why democracies are more peaceful. In
addition, the research itself has come under heavy criticism with scholars claiming that the evidence changes
depending on how you define “democracy,” “war,” and
“peace.” One rebuttal to the democratic peace theory is
found in the Big Mac Peace Theory; this cheeky modification points out that no two countries with a
McDonald’s have ever gone to war.11 The argument
claims that what the scholars are actually measuring
is economic development, not democracy. Here some
argue that a stable middle class (people who like their
current status) will not support a war that may jeopardize their standard of living. Alternatively, the causal
factors may be powerful economic elites who block any
move towards aggression against a country where they
hold financial ties and where war puts their economic
interests at risk. Along these lines, one compelling study
finds that the Democratic Peace Theory only holds
true between two democracies that have reached high
standards of economic development. Here the research
finds that poor democracies are more likely to fight each
other.12 So, perhaps it is economic development, global
capitalism, and the interdependence of foreign trade
that impedes war, not democracy.13

Stronger opponents actually argue that “good science” is creating dangerous policy. There are those that
fear that the research provides justification for countries
to go on democracy crusades. One issue they raise concerns the assumption that democracies create peaceful
peoples. Here, scholars question the idea that popular
will can mitigate war, particularly since war seems to
be rather popular in certain democracies.14 The United
States presents an interesting example of this as public
approval ratings of U.S. presidents tend to skyrocket
during war. For example, President George H.W. Bush
saw his public approval ratings rise to an unprecedented
89% during the 1991 Persian Gulf War when Americans
“rallied around the flag.”
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the Democratic Peace Theory concerns implementation—how do
you create a world of democracies? Here we find two
minds, one that advocates the active pursuit of a globe
full of democracies and one that promotes a more
passive policy. The latter view is found in the early
writings of Thomas Jefferson as he proclaimed, “A just
and solid republican government maintained here will
be a standing monument and example for… people
of other countries.” 15 Jefferson held that leadership by
example (where Western and American governments
practice virtue, self-restraint, and rule of law) would be
contagious. The second, stickier position involves the
active or even forceful pursuit of democratic political
systems. This position assumes that democracy will
be welcomed across the globe and can be transplanted
with relative ease. However, we are beginning to see that
some people do not see democracy as desirable. In fact,
there are people who view the Democratic Peace Theory
and its policy implications as thinly veiled imperialism.
In effect, they view the spread of democracy as an effort
to homogenize the world, rejecting local culture, indigenous institutions, and even popular preferences. Thus,
rather than viewing themselves as liberated, people and
their leaders in many non-democratic countries hear
this policy mandate as smug rhetoric. This also touches
on the very contentious debate about whether “gunpoint
democracy” will work or whether this actually presents a contradiction to the ideas of conflict resolution
through nonviolence.
Another thorny issue is that democratically elected
governments may not guarantee peaceful interests. Here
“one must be careful what one wishes for” as democratically elected leadership may not always be benign and/
or may pursue agendas in contrast to American interests. For example, during the Iraqi war Turkish voters
pressed their government not to provide support to the
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U.S. invasion of Iraq. The newly elected Hamas majority
in the Palestinian National Authority has also demonstrated its agenda is far from peaceful.
In conclusion, there is strong support on both sides
of the debate. One finds the quest for democratic
universalism as a powerful panacea to interstate war,
while the other sees it as a misguided and dangerous
foreign policy. What the debate does point out is that
creating democracies is enormously complicated and
requires significant time. One cannot just set up ballot
boxes, hold elections, and create moderate Democrats
and Republicans. Issues like rule of law, civic culture,
a stable and committed middle class, and legitimacy of
a democratic system may take years, if not decades, to
build. Furthermore, in Electing to Fight: Why Emerging
Democracies Go to War, Edward Mansfield and Jack
Snyder point out that transitional states or “semidemocratic regimes” may be extremely dangerous and
actually more likely to start wars.16 There is no guarantee that the introduction of democratic institutions
will be smooth, permanent, or accepted by either the
political elites in a country or by the masses. In fact,
some scholars point out that in most cases of newly
created democracies (the third-wave democracies)
the political institutions are weak, frail, and easily
reversible.17
Perhaps it is helpful to remember that in the United
States (typically regarded as the democratic success
story) it took almost 200 years, a civil war, a woman’s
suffrage movement, and a violent civil rights movement before we had universal suffrage and granted
most citizens of the country the right to participate in
politics. Thus, it may take decades or even generations
to establish embedded norms of tolerance, compromise,
and the value of power sharing in transitional countries. One thing remains clear: the ideas and debate on
Democratic Peace Theory will persist in both academic
and policy circles. This is particularly true as the United
States attempts implementation of these ideas in Iraq.
In fact, Presidential candidate Senator John McCain
recently affirmed his support for this view, calling for
a “new League of Democracies [to] form the core of an
international order of peace based on freedom.”18
The research is exciting and leads this author to
optimism. At the same time, this is a guarded optimism, as the scholarship needs to be implemented with
a sophisticated understanding and a fine instrument.
Forcibly pulling the weeds of non-democratic regimes
by their roots and bluntly transplanting western
democracy into areas where the soil may not be fertile

may be ineffective and actually promote violence. A fact
that policymakers tend to overlook is that in order for
the Democratic Peace Theory to hold, democracy itself
must be authentic, robust, stable, and accompanied by
economic development.

Endnotes
Mark Rupert, (2000) Ideologies of Globalization: Contending
Visions of a New World Order. Routledge; London: 27.
1

Spencer R. Weart, (1998), Never at War, Yale University
Press.
2

Michael Doyle, (1996) “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign
Affairs,” in Sean Lynn-Jones, Michael Brown and Steven
Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace. Cambridge:
MIT: 3–57.
3

Bruce Russett, (2000) “How Democracy, Interdependence,
and International Organizations Create a System for Peace,”
in Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene Wittfopk (eds.) The
Global Agenda 6th ed. Boston: McGraw-Hill: 235
4

R.J. Rummel, (1997) Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of
Nonviolence. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers.
5

Jack S. Levy, (1988) “Domestic Politics and War,” in Robert
I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and
Prevention of Major Wars. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press: 88.
6

George W. Bush, (2004) “President and Prime Minister
Blair Discussed Iraq, Middle East, The East Room”
November 12, 2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2004/11/20041112-5.html.
7

Alynna Lyon and Christopher Dolan, (2007) “American
Humanitarian Intervention: Toward a Theory of
Coevolution,” Foreign Policy Analysis 3 (1):146–78.
8

Henry Kissinger, (1994) Diplomacy. Simon & Schuster;
New York: 33.
9

Alexander Hamilton (1787) The Federalist No. 6
http://www.law.emory.edu/cms/site/index.php?id=3138
10

Thomas Friedman, (2000) The Lexus and the Olive Tree.
New York: Anchor Books. This has recently been updated
as The Dell Theory in which Friedman argues that “no two
countries that are both part of a major global supply chain,
like Dell’s, will ever fight a war against each other as long as
they are both part of the same global supply chain.”
Thomas Friedman (2005) The World is Flat. Farrar, Straus
and Giroux: 421.
11

Michael Mousseau, (2005) “Comparing New Theory with
Prior Beliefs: Market Civilization and the Democratic Peace,”
Conflict Management and Peace Science 22(1): 63–77.
12

Erich Weede, (2004) “The Diffusion of Prosperity and
Peace by Globalization,” The Independent Review 9(2).
13

A University Dialogue on Democracy 2007–2008

Sebastian Rosato, (2003) “The Flawed Logic of Democratic
Peace Theory,” American Political Science Review 97(4):
585–602.
14

15

Thomas Jefferson to John Dickinson, 1801. ME 10:217

Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, (2005) Electing to Fight:
Why Emerging Democracies Go to War: MIT Press.
16

Georg Sorensen, (1993) Democracy and Democratization:
Processes and Prospects in a Changing World. Boulder:
Westview Press: 62.
17

John McCain, (2007) Address to The Hoover Institution,
May 1. http://www.johnmccain.com/informing/news/
Speeches/43e821a2-ad70-495a-83b2-098638e67aeb.htm.
18

